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Abstract
In the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. election, researchers, policymakers and the general public are grappling with the no-
tion that the 45th president of the United States may very well owe his electoral victory to a sophisticated propaganda
effort masterminded by the Kremlin. This article synthesizes existing research on Russia’s domestic information controls,
its internet policy at the global level (notably via internet governance processes), and the country’s resurgence as a major
geopolitical player to argue that policymakers as well as the general public should consider these themes holistically, par-
ticularly as they formulate responses to what many see as the Russian threat to Western liberal democracy. Russia may
have lost the Cold War, but it is now waging information warfare against the liberal democracies of Europe and North
America in a sophisticated bid to win the next round. Russia does not view internet governance, cybersecurity, and media
policy as separate domains. Rather, all the areas covered by those disciplines fall under “information security” for Russian
foreign policy. The paper begins by tracing the history of information controls within what is now the Russian Federation
before discussing the role of information and internet policy in Russian foreign policy, drawing connections between the
Russian government’s control andmanipulation of information—including its internet policy—in the domestic and interna-
tional arenas. Next, it discusses the spread of networked authoritarianism and suggests that a “geopolitics of information”
will become increasingly necessary in the coming years. Just as networked authoritarianism establishes strategic infras-
tructures to control the message domestically and intervene in global media systems, liberal democracies need to rethink
media and communication infrastructures to ensure they foster pluralist, rights-respecting societies that are resilient to
authoritarianism and extremism. In doing so, they should resist the temptation to respond to this threat in ways that will
erode democracy even further, such as expanded surveillance and limits on free expression.
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1. Introduction
After a long and bitter electoral campaign, the results
of the 2016 U.S. election have precipitated an ongoing
constitutional crisis, and continued uncertainty about
the role of Russia’s government in Donald Trump’s elec-
toral victory has prompted renewed interest in Russia,
a country that hadn’t been at the forefront of the na-
tional agenda since the end of the Cold War. Several
factors contribute to making the current situation a per-
fect storm of uncertainty and ambiguity, including: pol-
icymakers’ and the public’s comparative lack of knowl-
edge about Russia; the difficulty of parsing out some-
thing resembling empirical truth from the jumble of offi-
cial statements, leaks, speculations and claims made by
the various actors involved; the tumultuous presidential
transition; and the arcane nature of the empirical claims
underlying the web of controversy surrounding the elec-
tion and any role Russia might have had in influencing
the result. It will take time and serious effort for the dust
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to settle; an analysis of the events leading up the 2016
election, or of the election’s aftermath, would be prema-
ture. However, at this stage it is appropriate to consider
what we do know about Russia’s policies concerning in-
formation, the internet and international relations under
Vladimir Putin.
There is a natural tendency in scholarship and policy
to work within disciplinary silos, without sufficiently con-
sidering related developments that are better aligned
with a different field of expertise. At a time when Amer-
ican interest in Russia is at perhaps its highest since the
end of the Cold War, it is important to consider all of
Russia’s information and internet policy, both domestic
and international, in order to properly situate current de-
velopments and formulate policy responses that defend
and support democracy and human rights. The topic is a
complex one, and it would be impossible to cover it en-
tirely, with all its nuances and complexities, in an article-
length piece. My aim here is twofold: to draw connec-
tions between the Russian government’s control andma-
nipulation of information—including its internet policy—
both domestically and externally, and to theorize on the
spread of networked authoritarianism and the future of
the geopolitics of information.
This article was written for a thematic issue on “In-
ternet Policy After Snowden”, but it is broader than that
in at least two ways. First, it goes beyond narrow defi-
nitions of internet policy to consider several aspects of
Russian information and communication policy that are
inextricably intertwined. And second, it has very little
to say about Edward Snowden. At least in the Russian
context, the 2013 Snowden revelations mainly serve as
a temporal marker. They alerted global public opinion
to mass surveillance and made possible a change in the
Kremlin’s rhetoric, but did not cause a shift in Russian
policy. If there was a turning point in Russian internet
policy, that moment was in 2011: the year of the Arab
Spring, but also the year that Russian civil society used
social media to organize protests of the legislative elec-
tion, aboutwhich then-U.S. Secretary of StateHillary Clin-
ton expressed “serious concerns” (Labott, 2011). It was
also the year before Putin resumed the presidency, after
swapping roles with Dmitri Medvedev for four years.
In this article, I synthesize existing research on Rus-
sia’s domestic information controls policy, internet policy
at the global level (notably via internet governance pro-
cesses), and the country’s resurgence as a major geopo-
litical player to argue that policymakers as well as the
general public should consider these themes holistically,
particularly as they formulate responses to what many
see as the Russian threat to Western liberal democracy.
In doing so, they should resist the temptation to re-
spond to this threat in ways that will erode democracy
even further, such as expanded surveillance and limits
on free expression.
Methodologically, the article relies chiefly on sec-
ondary sources, including translations of Russian sources
and sources written in English by Russian journalists,
while drawing on my interactions with a variety of pol-
icy experts (both Russian and Western) in the course of
other ongoing work, some of whom have asked to re-
main anonymous for their own safety. Throughout the
article I consider information policy, media policy and
internet policy holistically, as they are closely interre-
lated. The article begins by tracing the history of informa-
tion controls (which predate the internet) within what is
now the Russian Federation before discussing the role
of information and internet policy in Russian foreign pol-
icy. Next, I discuss the spread of networked authoritar-
ianism and suggest that a “geopolitics of information”
will become increasingly necessary as the 21st century
marches on, and theorize onwhat thismight be, conclud-
ing with a call to defend, protect and improve Western
liberal democracy.
2. Information in Russia Before the Internet
This section traces the history of the media and informa-
tion controls in Russia, which is distinct from the history
of the press and the media in the West. Media in Rus-
sia have always served as instruments of political propa-
ganda, going back to the country’s first newspaper. Ve-
domosti was founded in 1702 to disseminate the czar’s
wishes, plans, and priorities across the country, and to
build popular support for the ruler (Rohlenko, 2007). Un-
der the USSR, information was considered a dangerous
commodity to be feared and controlled, rather than a
right and a public good. Contrary to liberal conceptions
of a free press serving as a fourth branch of governance
and fostering a habermasian public sphere (Habermas,
1989), the Soviet regime saw the media as a danger to
be tightly controlled, with only select elites permitted ac-
cess to objective news or to foreign publications (Gorny,
2007; Soldatov & Borogan, 2015). For example, own-
ership and use of photocopiers were tightly restricted
in an attempt to prevent the distribution of samizdat,
photocopied pamphlets of “subversive” material (Han-
son, 2008).
It is no accident of history that the collapse of the
USSR coincided with the emergence of the information
society in theWest. Indeed, Castells and Kiselyova (1995)
argue that this death grip on information was the pri-
mary reason for the USSR’s implosion. The 1990s were
a period of relative freedom for the press in post-Soviet
Russia, albeit a short-lived one as the levers of power—
recently relinquished by the Communist Party—were
seized by the new oligarch class. The media were no
longer beholden to a monolithic ideology, but instead
answered to a variety of corporate backers whose in-
terests didn’t always align. Print media lost their state
subsidies and saw their circulation and importance de-
cline precipitously, leaving broadcast TV to take over
as the country’s predominant communication medium
(Ognyanova, 2015).
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, Yeltsin’s chosen succes-
sor, first assumed the presidency of the Russian Federa-
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tion in 1999, and quickly restored the Kremlin’s control
over print and broadcast media—a move that he char-
acterized as “liberating” news outlets from the oligarchs.
For many Russia experts, understanding Putin is key to
understanding Russia today. Putin served in the Soviet in-
telligence agency, the KGB, for 16 years, rising to the rank
of colonel, and he spent much of the pivotal perestroika
years outside of Russia. His views on governance, the rule
of law, the role of information in society, and the Russian
national interest are very much influenced by the KGB’s
authoritarian traditions, themselves grounded in the au-
thoritarianism of imperial Russia. Putin switched posts
with his prime minister, Dmitri Medvedev, in 2008 to cir-
cumvent constitutional term limits, and in 2012 Putin re-
turned to the Kremlin and redoubled his efforts to con-
trol the internet (Ognyanova, 2015; Soldatov & Boro-
gan, 2015).
The end of the Cold War, which also ended Russia’s
superpower status (as nominal as itmight have been, par-
ticularly toward the end), was a sore spot for the Rus-
sian elite, which perceived the U.S.’s success in exporting
its cultural products as a threat to national sovereignty.
Elites also resented growing U.S. influence in Eastern Eu-
rope and Central Asia, which they saw as their rightful
sphere of influence, and the European Union’s eastward
expansion. Over the course of his first presidency (2000–
2008), during which time domestic internet access grew
considerably, Putin came to see the information revo-
lution as “one of the most pervasive components of
U.S. expansionism in the post-Soviet sphere, most no-
tably in Russia itself” (Nocetti, 2015, p. 129). Where oth-
ers might have seen opportunities for innovation and
growth, Putin saw threats to the status quo and his hold
on power, thus following in the footsteps of his Soviet
and pre-bolshevik predecessors alike.
3. The Russian Information Controls Regime
Ronald Deibert and his team at the University of
Toronto’s Citizen Lab coined the phrase “information
controls” to describe the “techniques, practices, regula-
tions or policies that strongly influence the availability
of electronic information for social, political, ethical, or
economic ends”. These include technical means like “fil-
tering, distributed denial of service attacks, electronic
surveillance, malware, or other computer-based means
of denying, shaping and monitoring information” and
policies like “laws, social understandings of ‘inappropri-
ate’ content, media licensing, content removal, defama-
tion policies, slander laws, secretive sharing of data be-
tween public and private bodies, or strategic lawsuit
actions” (Citizen Lab, 2015). As a field of inquiry, in-
formation controls can also include the means of cir-
cumventing or otherwise countering barriers to the free
flow of information online. Importantly, the field is in-
herently multidisciplinary and transcends the barrier be-
tween academia and civil society, with many important
advances coming from activists and nonprofits.
The Freedom on the Net Index classifies informa-
tion controls under three broad categories: obstacles to
access, limits to content, and violations of user rights
(Karlekar & Cook, 2009). Compared to China, Russia
rarely uses obstacles to access (which include infras-
tructural and economic barriers as well as shutdowns
and application-level blocking), relying instead on cen-
sorship and intimidation. However, Russia is taking steps
to create an internet “kill switch”, allowing it to discon-
nect the RuNet from the global network “in case of
crisis”, without specifying what such a crisis might en-
tail beyond vague allusions to the internet being shut
off from the outside (Duffy, 2015; Nocetti, 2015). Inter-
net shutdowns—whether of all connection to the out-
side world, or of specific applications and protocols like
VOIP, Twitter or WhatsApp—are used by governments
like Egypt, Uganda and Iran to control the flow of infor-
mation around elections, protests, and other politically
sensitive events (DeNardis, 2014). The advocacy organi-
zation Access Now has reported a marked increase in
the number of network shutdowns worldwide in recent
years (Access Now, 2016). The Russian “kill switch” sys-
tem has yet to be put into effect, as of this writing.
Censorship and violations of user rights, then, have
historically been the principal mechanisms for informa-
tion control in Russia. Katherine Ognyanova (2015) iden-
tifies three mechanisms through which the Russian state
asserts power over the media: censorship and resulting
chilling effects, state control overmainstream (especially
broadcast) media, and the selective application of unre-
lated laws (building codes, tax laws, criminal laws, and
intellectual property laws have all been used for this pur-
pose) to put pressure on media organizations as well as
individual journalists, bloggers, and activists. Extrajudi-
cial executions are not uncommon. This is inmanyways a
continuation of the mechanisms used by successive Rus-
sian and Soviet governments to control the traditional
print and broadcast media (Ognyanova, 2015). One key
difference from the Soviet era is that the domestic me-
dia has since been privatized, and foreign companies—
notably internet intermediaries—now operate in Russia
as well.
In Russia, as in most countries, the physical structure
of the internet is built, owned and maintained by the pri-
vate sector. Companies like internet companies, Internet
Service Providers (ISPs), social networking sites (SNSs),
search engines, blogging platforms, and more then exer-
cise a form of de facto private governance over online
activity (MacKinnon, 2012). This private rule-making can
come into conflict with the law. Absent a strong rule of
law, governments can use their power to constrain, in-
fluence and even coerce information and telecommuni-
cations (ICT) companies. As Laura DeNardis notes, “state
control of Internet governance functions via private inter-
mediaries has equipped states with new forms of some-
times unaccountable and nontransparent power over in-
formation flows” (DeNardis, 2014, p. 15).We now turn to
an examination of how the Russian state practices cen-
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sorship and surveillance with the assistance of the pri-
vate sector.
4. Censorship
Media in the Russian Federation, including the internet,
is regulated by a branch of the Ministry of Communica-
tions and Mass Media, the Federal Service for Supervi-
sion of Communications, Information Technology, and
Mass Media, better known as Roskomnadzor. Unlike the
UK’s Ofcom or the U.S. Federal Communications Com-
mission, which are independent agencies with no power
of prior restraint (the main enforcement mechanism is
to assess fines), Roskomnadzor can block certain types
of content without a court order: calls for unsanctioned
public actions (i.e. protests), so-called extremist content,
materials that violate copyright, information about juve-
nile victims of crime, child abuse imagery, drug propa-
ganda, and information about suicide—as can several
other agencies, including the Federal Drug Control Ser-
vice, the Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer
Rights and Human Wellbeing, and the Prosecutor Gen-
eral’s Office (Freedom House, 2015). Other types of con-
tent can also be blocked, but a court order is required.
While the authority to censor rests with the state,
the responsibility to implement censorship falls on the
internet service providers, who are held legally responsi-
ble for any forbidden content that is accessible to their
users, a legal construct known as intermediary liability
(MacKinnon, Hickock, Bar, & Lim, 2014). Since 2014, the
Russian media regulator Roskomnadzor has maintained
a block list of websites featuring banned content, includ-
ing child abuse imagery, drug-related content, and “sui-
cide advocacy”. ISPs must regularly consult this “black-
list” of verboten websites, and are incentivized to in-
terpret blocking orders as widely as possible to avoid
liability for under-censoring, which can result in heavy
fines and even the loss of their state licenses. The “black-
list” itself is often vague as to which page within a web-
site or service should be blocked, or only specifies an IP
address—which can represent any number of websites.
Crucially, the list itself is secret, leaving internet users
in the dark as to what is actually prohibited (Freedom
House, 2015, 2016).
Roskomnadzor’s powers are even greater with re-
spect to websites that are registered as mass media—
a broader category than one might think, thanks to
the “Bloggers’ Law”. As early as 2001, the then-press
minister, Mikhail Lesin,1 “called for legislation requiring
the registration of Internet media outlets”, which would
have included any website registered with the .su or
.ru top-level domain (TLD) (Ulmanu, 2001, as cited in
Bowles, 2006). Lesin finally got his wish in 2014, when
the so-called “Bloggers Law” was instituted, requiring
all online outlets (including blogs and personal pages
within social networking sites) with more than 3,000
daily page views to register with the government, while
the “Law Against Retweets” punishes the dissemination
or re-dissemination of “extremist content” with up to
five years in prison. “Extremist content” is defined so
vaguely that it can be interpreted to include many kinds
of speech that would be considered innocuous in many
other countries. Another 2014 law prohibits the use of
public wifi without providing one’s mobile phone num-
ber. Acquiring a SIM card, in turn, requires providing
one’s passport number, as does signing up for home in-
ternet access. It is all but impossible, then, to surf the
“RuNet” (as the Russian-language internet is called) with-
out linking one’s online activity to one’s identity and pass-
port (Duffy, 2015).
Under Article 4 of the law “On Mass Media”, the reg-
ulator can issue warnings to an outlet’s editorial board
about “abuse of freedomofmassmedia”, a category that
includes such infractions as obscene language, informa-
tion about illegal drugs, extremism, incitement to terror-
ism, and propaganda and cruelty. Here again, the specific
interpretation of these terms leads to censorship well be-
yond what a literal reading of the law might suggest. For
example, news sites have received warnings for publish-
ing stories about calls for greater local governance (“fed-
eralization”) and for government reform, and about in-
ternational news events related to freedom of expres-
sion such as the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices in
Paris in January 2015 (Freedom House, 2015).
In addition to legislative and technical controls, the
flow of information on the Russian internet is limited
by two “soft” factors: cultural norms and practices
grounded in centuries of authoritarianism, and deliber-
ate framing of the internet as dangerous (Ognyanova,
2015). The Russian political class and broadcast media
work together to frame the internet as a dangerous place,
and online content as “unreliable, biased, and danger-
ous” (Kratasjuk, 2006; Ognyanova, 2015). For example,
the mayor of Moscow wrote that “propaganda of drugs
and violence, human trafficking and child prostitution—
that’s the reality of today’s internet”, asserting that “the
Internet is gradually being settled by unconcealed ter-
rorists who turn the web, not only into their own mail-
box, but into a real, underground,military infrastructure”
(Ognyanova, 2015). The strategy seems to be effective.
Indeed, the report “Benchmarking Public Dissent: Rus-
sia’s Appetite for Internet Control” found that 49% of all
Russians believe that information on the internet needs
to be censored, while 42% of Russians believe foreign
countries are using the internet against Russia and its in-
terests, and 24% think the internet threatens political sta-
bility (Nisbet, 2015). Propaganda of the kind described
above allows the Kremlin to present its restrictions on
the free flow of information as responses to popular will.
Restrictions on free expression continue apace, as
the 2016 Yarovaya laws place new restrictions on “prose-
lytizing” (i.e. discussing one’s religion with potential con-
verts) and require anyonewith knowledge that someone
else is “planning” certain kinds of crimes,mainly offenses
1 Lesin was found dead, seemingly of a blow to the head, in a Washington hotel in November 2015. See Smith and Walker (2016).
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that involve expressing dissenting views, to notify the au-
thorities (Lokshina, 2016).
5. Surveillance
Domestic surveillance in Russia predates the internet,
of course. As with censorship, the current surveillance
regime is historically grounded in the country’s Soviet
and imperial past. The KGBmay have a newacronym, FSB
(standing for Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti, or Fed-
eral Security Service), but it casts a long shadow (Solda-
tov & Borogan, 2015).
The System of Operational-Investigatory Measures
(SORM) was first implemented in 1995, requiring
telecommunications operators to install FSB-provided
hardware allowing the agency to monitor users’ commu-
nications metadata and content—including phone calls,
email traffic and web browsing activity, despite the low
internet penetration rate at the time.
Coming in the final year of Yeltsin’s presidency, the
1999 SORM-2 reform required the FSB to obtain a post-
collection courtwarrant to access records (Bowles, 2006).
This was an encouraging sign that the intelligence ser-
vices of the new Russian Federation would be governed
by the rule of the law. However, shortly after taking of-
fice, Putin authorized several additional agencies to ac-
cess SORM’s collected data, including the tax authorities,
border patrol and customs agencies, and the Presiden-
tial Security Service. The warrant requirement remains
in place, but is remarkably toothless: surveillance can be-
gin before the warrant is granted (or even requested),
the warrant need not be shown to anyone (whether the
surveillance target or the telecom operator), and it is
only required for the retrieval of collected communica-
tions content, and not for the metadata that is often just
as revealing as content, if not more so. In 2012 SORM-2
was expanded to include social media platforms, though
documentation of how this works in practice is scant (Pa-
ganini, 2014; Soldatov & Borogan, 2012, 2015). Never-
theless, the assumption among Russian digital rights ac-
tivists is that any information shared on Russian social
networks like Vkontakte or Odnoklassniki is collected by
the intelligence services (author interviews, 2016).
The latest update to SORM came in 2014, when the
Ministry of Communications ordered companies to in-
stall new equipment with Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)
capability (Soldatov & Borogan, 2015). As DeNardis puts
it, “DPI is a transformational technology that creates un-
precedented regulatory possibilities for controlling the
flow of content online” (2014, p. 206). Demonstrating
why this is the case requires a basic understanding of the
technology itself. Information (whether it’s text, voice, or
something else) is transmitted over the internet as pack-
ets, small bundles of data that are individually routed
from the sender to the receiver, then put back together
in the correct order. Packets consist of both payload
(the actual content of the communication) and a header,
which contains the packet’s metadata: its origin, desti-
nation, and not much else. The header is analogous to
an envelope, telling each piece of equipment along the
way where the payload should be delivered. Until fairly
recently, computing power limited the types of analy-
ses that routers, switches and other network hardware
could perform on passing traffic, but advances in this
domain have made it possible for hardware to simul-
taneously process millions of packets, reading not just
the headers but the payload as well. Unless the packet
is encrypted, the only impediment to stopping a DPI-
capablemachine from reading the payload are social and
legal norms against this type of surveillance—which are
absent in Russia. From there it is possible to block or
throttle back traffic based on its origin, destination, file
type (text, voice, multimedia), protocol (P2P, FTP, HTML,
SMTP) or the content of the message itself (DeNardis,
2014). Here again, there is little reliable, publicly avail-
able information on how SORM-3 works, as discussing
the topic is against the law. The new, secret regulations
came into effect in fall 2016, and apply to all ISPs in Rus-
sia. Noncompliance comes at a steep price: stern warn-
ings from Roskomnadzor followed by revocation of the
ISP’s license. Extra-legal intimidation is common, and for-
mal enforcement appears to be increasing. Indeed, inves-
tigative journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan ob-
tained internal Roskomnadzor statistics that showed that
the number of warnings issued by the agency grew from
16 in 2010 to 30 in 2012 (Soldatov & Borogan, 2013).
Also in 2012, SORM was applied to social network-
ing sites, a key area of concern for Russian authorities
given the role of such sites in various “color revolutions”
and the 2011 Arab Spring (Howard & Hussain, 2013). As
Soldatov and Borogan note, the tools used tomonitor so-
cial networking sites had a crucial flaw:
These systems were developed for searching struc-
tured computer files, or databases, and only after-
wards adapted, some more successfully than others,
for semantic analysis of the Internet. Most of these
systems were designed to work with open sources
and are incapable of monitoring closed accounts such
as Facebook.
The FSB discovered early on that the only way to deal
with the problem was to turn to SORM. The licenses
require businesses that rent out site space on servers
to give the security services access to these servers
via SORM, without informing the site owners. With
this provision, the FSB has had few problems moni-
toring closed groups and accounts on Russian social
networks Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki. But Facebook
and Twitter don’t store their user data in Russia, keep-
ing it out of SORM’s reach. (Soldatov and Borogan,
2013, para. 20)
Edward Snowden’s revelations about the U.S. National
Security Agency’s PRISM program, which tapped into
American ICT companies’ data centers to extract desired
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information, provided the perfect justification for requir-
ing all data pertaining to Russian citizens to be stored
within the Russian Federation. Brazil and several Euro-
pean countries have made announcements about even-
tual data localization requirements, aswell, providing fur-
ther legitimacy to the Russian plan in the eyes of public
opinion. However, there is no evidence that data localiza-
tion does much to protect user privacy (Sargsyan, 2016).
Indeed, it is much easier (and more clearly within the
bounds of U.S. law) for the U.S. intelligence apparatus to
target data outside of the U.S., while locating data cen-
ters within Russia makes it easier for Russian agencies to
access user content. Data localization serves to increase
the Kremlin’s access to citizen data under the guise of
protecting the Russian public from American spies.
The 2016 Yarovaya laws further expanded the govern-
ment’s surveillance powers by increasing the mandatory
data retention period to sixmonths for content and three
years for metadata and mandating cryptographic back-
doors in all messaging applications (Lokshina, 2016).
6. Conscripting the Private Sector
Twenty-first century information controls in Russia distin-
guish themselves from earlier systems of repression in
two key ways: the introduction of ICT technologies, and
the irruption of the private sector in what was previously
a totalitarian, state-controlled ecosystem. Moscow’s ap-
petite for surveillance has grown apace with the poten-
tial targets provided by widespread ICT adoption, and
the FSB-oligarchic alliance that dominates both the state
and the economy excels at finding ways to pressure ICT
companies to provide the needed access to data flows.
A 2013 study by the now-defunct Center for the
Study of Media and Society at the New Economic School
in Moscow2 sought to ascertain the policies and mecha-
nisms used by domestic Russian ICT companies to pro-
tect the digital rights of their users. Conducted during
a time of great uncertainty for the ICT sector in Russia,
the study found that company representatives were hes-
itant to discuss issues of human rights (preferring the
term “user rights”), the pressures they faced from the
Kremlin, or the possibility of doing anything other than
following the law. The majority of companies reported
that they comply with all demands from the government,
while only a few seemed to try to negotiate these de-
mands. All of the companies surveyed reported being
sensitive to government demands and having to con-
tend with censorship issues, all the while insisting that
they adhered to high standards of privacy and security
(Maréchal et al., 2015; Petrova, Fossato, Indina, Dokuka,
& Asmolov, 2013).
The Russian government ensures the compliance of
domestic companies in particular by holding them li-
able for banned, copyrighted or otherwise illegal content
accessible through their services or platforms. This in-
termediary liability strongly incentivizes ICT companies
to block or remove any content that might plausibly
be deemed illegal, lest they suffer grave repercussions
(Petrova et al., 2013). Indeed, protection rackets and re-
lated thuggery are endemic in Russia, and business own-
ers can find themselves targeted for prosecutions of du-
bious legal merit simply because they have upset the
wrong oligarch or FSB operative (Pomerantsev, 2014). Le-
gal remedies are nonexistent in these cases, leaving sub-
mission and exile as the only viable options. The current
context of quick legislative reform and uneven enforce-
ment keeps companies—and their staff—in a state of
constant uncertainty about the rules and the penalties
for breaking them.
Foreign companies operating in Russia typically have
deeper pockets, greater technical and managerial know-
how, and reduced vulnerability to physical threats com-
pared to their domestic counterparts. Google closed its
Russian engineering offices in late 2014 (Luhn, 2014),
and a number of former high-level executives have left
the country (author interview, 2016). Neither Facebook
nor Twitter have offices in Russia (Masnick, 2014), and
without local staff who could face retaliation, the Amer-
ican platforms have greater leeway to push back against
demands for censorship or for user information. Accord-
ing to Twitter’s Transparency Report, the company re-
fused to comply with any of the 233 requests for user in-
formation it received from Moscow in 2014–2015 (Twit-
ter, 2015, 2016), and complied with only 5% of take-
down requests received in the second half of 2015 (Twit-
ter, 2016). Similarly, Google only produced user infor-
mation for 5% of Russian government requests in the
first half of 2015, though it complied with 62% of take-
down requests during that period (Google, 2016). Face-
book didn’t comply with any Russian requests for user in-
formation, and restricted 56 pieces of content. The com-
pany does not disclose the number of requests for con-
tent restriction it received (Facebook, 2016).
Unlike domestic Russian companies, Google and
Facebook (though not Twitter) are members of the
Global Network Initiative, employ legal teams and other
experts dedicated to advancing their users’ digital rights,
and engage in public transparency reporting about these
issues. These efforts should be supported and encour-
aged. But if these companies comply with data localiza-
tion laws, their users’ data will fall into SORM’s net, par-
ticularly given SORM-3’s more powerful DPI capabilities.
If they refuse, Roskomnadzor may very well block the
sites entirely, as at least some of its officials have wanted
to do for years (Masnick, 2014).
LinkedIn became the first foreign social media com-
pany to be banned from Russia, in part due to non-
compliance with the data localization law. Roskomnad-
zor had sued the social networking site, which was ac-
2 The Center received much of its funding fromWestern charitable foundations, which it is now prohibited from doing under the Russian law on “foreign
agents”. Unsurprisingly, the Center has not been able to identify domestic sources of funding, and much of its former staff is now living in the West
(author interview, 2016).
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quired by Microsoft earlier in 2016, for illegally sharing
the personal data of non-users without obtaining prior
consent—a claim that, if true, would indeed put LinkedIn
afoul of data management best practices. The suit also
argued that LinkedIn did not comply with data localiza-
tion requirements. In its August 4, 2016, ruling, the court
ordered Russian authorities to “take steps” to limit ac-
cess to the site, though as of late October it remained
accessible to most users (Rothrock, 2016). LinkedIn lost
its appeal in November, and Roskomnadzor required Ap-
ple and Google to remove the LinkedIn app from the Rus-
sian versions of their respective app stores (Kang & Ben-
ner, 2017; Scott, 2016). With Roskomnadzor due to be-
gin proactively enforcing foreign companies’ compliance
with data localization in 2017, the decisions of U.S. ICT
companies like Google, Facebook and Twitter will be a
test of the firms’ commitment to user privacy and free-
dom of expression.
7. Russian Information and Internet Policy at the
International Level
Russian internet policy—in both the domestic and for-
eign policy spheres—is rooted in the premise that West-
ern countries (mainly the U.S.) use the internet to over-
throw governments in “countries where the opposition
is tooweak tomobilize protests” (Nocetti, 2015, p. 114)—
or, in other words, countries living under authoritarian
regimes. Russian foreign policy hews to a strict interpre-
tation of Westphalian nation-state sovereignty, at the
core of which is the principle of non-intervention.3 The
free and open internet threatens that principle, allow-
ing foreign and potentially subversive viewpoints to cir-
culate across Russia. The “color revolutions” of the early
21st century and the Arab Spring have further fueled con-
cerns that the internet represents a threat to the status
quo and that it poses a threat to Russian political leaders
(Nocetti, 2015). Indeed, opposition groups led by Alexei
Navalny used Facebook to coordinate street protests in
the aftermath of the 2011 legislative elections, andwhile
the protests failed to coalesce into a lasting social move-
ment, such an outcome was not completely outside the
realm of possibility (Soldatov & Borogan, 2015; White
& McAllister, 2014). Moreover, there is good reason to
believe that Putin sees the U.S., and specifically then-
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, as directly responsible
for fomenting these protests. Under this paradigm, such
interference in Russia’s domestic politics constitutes a vi-
olation of national sovereignty tantamount to informa-
tion warfare. Likewise, U.S. policy initiatives like democ-
racy promotion and the Internet Freedom Agenda are
seen as promoting political projects that are alignedwith
U.S. interests, almost invariably at the expense of Rus-
sia’s own interests (Nocetti, 2015).
Digital rights and the free flow of information are
thus doubly threatening to the Kremlin. Not only does
the internet embolden and empower the domestic op-
position, it is (from Putin’s perspective) closely associ-
ated with the U.S. government, which has historically
played a unique role in internet governance and is a ma-
jor funder of the global digital rights movement. In Rus-
sia’sWestphalian viewof theworld, nation-states are the
only actors that matter, and that should matter, and the
actions of all other actors (be they individuals, civil so-
ciety organizations, or corporations) can be imputed to
a government motivated by the accumulation of power.
That is the logic behind the 2012 law “On foreign agents”,
which stigmatizes internationally-funded NGOs that criti-
cize the Kremlin by labelling them as “traitors” or “spies”
(Human Rights Watch, 2017).
The Kremlin responded to what it sees as an exis-
tential threat by launching a campaign to reshape its
near-abroad in its image, most dramatically in Estonia
and Ukraine. The European and American response was
tepid, and Putin grew bolder. Before long, the Kremlin
was providing financial and ideological support to far-
right parties and movement across the European Union,
including Viktor Orbán in Hungary, the Brexit “Leave”
campaign, and pro-Russian candidates in Bulgaria and
Moldova (Eichenwald, 2017; Oliphant, 2016). A transna-
tional, neo-fascist, authoritarian movement grounded
in ethno-nationalism was taking shape. And then, of
course, there is Donald Trump. Early analysis suggests
that Trump was initially no more than a “useful fool” to
be used to discredit Hillary Clinton and cast doubts on
her legitimacy as president, but after a series of astound-
ing events, the election, of course, went another way.
The 2017 elections in France and Germany will be the
next tests.
French Russia expert Julien Nocetti (2015) argues
that “Moscow is crucially involved in the politicization of
global cyber issues, to a large extent owing to the inextri-
cable interweaving of the Russian Federation’s domestic
and external affairs” (p. 112). He stresses that:
The slogan “content as threat” encapsulates the Rus-
sian perception that digital technologies can be used
as tools against Russia. In Russian documentation it is
expressed more fully as the “threat of the use of con-
tent for influence on the socio-humanitarian sphere”.
The notion of content as threat is reinforced by the
projection onto foreign partners of Russia’s own pre-
conceptions of how international relations work, and
by the presumption that a primary aim of western
powers is to disrupt and undermine Russia. (p. 116)
For many years, Russia simultaneously sought to con-
strain the use of this powerful weapon (information)
through international norms and treaties even as it de-
veloped its own offensive capabilities, echoing its Cold
War approach to nuclear weapons. Since 1998—shortly
before Putin became president—Russia has proposed
3 AWestphalian paradigm doesn’t mean that a country won’t interfere in another country’s affairs; it means that any such intervention is considered an
act of war.
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annual UN resolutions prohibiting “information aggres-
sion”, which Nocetti interprets to mean the use of ideas
or ideology to undermine regime stability (2015, p. 122).
This is only one example of Russian attempts to regulate
the use of information under international law. At the
same time, Russia uses the Shanghai Coordination Orga-
nization (SCO) to provide technical assistance and knowl-
edge transfer to other illiberal regimes eager to up their
information controls game. This authoritarians’ club fur-
ther includes China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan, with several other countries having ob-
server or dialogue partner status. Russia and China use
the SCO to share new advances in repression with one
another, as well as with the less powerful member states
whose regimes they want to bolster (Diamond, Plattner,
& Walker, 2016; Nocetti, 2015).
8. Edward Snowden
More than three years after his initial revelations, Ed-
ward Snowden’s continued asylum in Russia remains per-
plexing for many observers, some of whom speculate
that the former NSA contractor must be a Russian agent,
even if a reluctant one. The Snowden camp categorically
denies this, and available evidence strongly suggests that
Snowden’s arrival in Moscow was not of his own mak-
ing. Shortly after coming out to the world as the source
for the Guardian andWashington Post stories about NSA
surveillance, Snowden left Hong Kong for Latin America,
with a layover in Moscow. He was accompanied by Wik-
iLeaks’s Sarah Harrison, who was apparently sent by Ju-
lian Assange to help escort Snowden to safety. There are
only somany options for this route, andMoscow seemed
to pose the fewest risks of being intercepted by U.S. of-
ficials. Unfortunately for Snowden, his passport was re-
vokedwhile hewas in the air, and hewas stuckwithin the
Moscow airport for 39 days while his asylum application
was processed. Snowden was granted temporary asylum
in Russia for a year, followed by a three-year residency
permit in 2014 that was later extended to 2020 (Green-
wald, 2014; Harding, 2014; Sharkov, 2016; Williams &
Toropin, 2017).
As the world grappled with the unprecedented reve-
lations of U.S. spying, and the key role played by internet
platforms and telecommunications companies in collec-
tion programs like PRISM, governments explored ways
to protect their citizens from the NSA’s reach. Data lo-
calization schemes were proposed by countries as varied
as Brazil, China, France, Germany, South Korea and Rus-
sia with the stated aim of ameliorating privacy risks from
foreign surveillance. But in Russia at least, data localiza-
tion laws “leveraged the public outrage and the height-
ened privacy concerns caused by the NSA spying to ex-
tend their control over data and their surveillance poten-
tial by data localization” (Sargsyan, 2016). The Kremlin
thus seized the Snowden revelations, as well as his pres-
ence in Moscow, as an opportunity to craft a narrative
that furthered its political objective: to portray the U.S.
and its allies as the real adversaries of privacy and indi-
vidual autonomy while continuing to intensify domestic
censorship, surveillance, and the dismantling of Russian
civil society. Meanwhile, Snowden has been an outspo-
ken critic of Russian policy (Nechepurenko, 2016).
9. Analysis: Understanding Russia’s Networked
Authoritarianism
The key to understanding Russian internet policy is that
it is part and parcel of an overall information control pol-
icy, the goal of which is the accumulation of power and
wealth for Russia’s kleptocratic elites. The global prac-
tice of information controls has undergone three gen-
erational shifts in rapid succession (Deibert, Palfrey, Ro-
hozinski, & Zittrain, 2010). First generation controls pre-
vent the population from accessing forbidden content,
either through barriers to access or by blocking specific
websites or pages. China’s “Great Firewall” is a classic ex-
ample of first generation information controls, and the
Roskomnadzor blacklist is a poorly executed example of
the same. The second generation involves creating le-
gal and technical frameworks allowing public and pri-
vate authorities to deny access to information on a case-
by-case basis. “Just-in-time” blocking and sporadic inter-
net shutdowns linked to specific political events exem-
plify this method. Third-generation controls combine le-
gal and technical means with a proactive public relations
(or propaganda) strategy: “it is less a matter of refusing
access as of competing with potential threats through
effective counter-information campaigns which discredit
or demoralize the opponent” (Deibert et al., p. 16). The
Kremlin’s army of online trolls and use of broadcast and
online media for domestic and external propaganda ex-
emplify such third-generation controls. Deibert further
identifies advocating for illiberal practices in internet gov-
ernance arenas as a possible fourth generation of infor-
mation controls (Deibert, 2016). This is already a core
part of Russian foreign policy, as discussed above. The re-
sult is “networked authoritarianism” (MacKinnon, 2011),
a political system that leverages ICTs and media regula-
tion to carefully control the expression of dissent in a
way that gives the impression of limited freedom of ex-
pression without allowing dissent to gain traction. Rus-
sia has long been “on the cutting edge of techniques
aimed to control online speech with little or no direct fil-
tering” (p. 43).
While historically Russia has indeed eschewed the
more heavy-handed information controls in favor of
second- and third-generation tactics, since Putin’s 2012
return to the presidency—preceded by popular demon-
strations that shared many characteristics of successful
“color” revolutions (White & McAllister, 2014)—there
have been increasing signs that the gloves are coming
off. Google chairman Eric Schmidt worried as early as
2013 that Russia was beginning to copy China in inter-
net censorship (Luhn, 2014), while SORM-3 and data lo-
calization requirements (including the LinkedIn ban) are
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further indications that the Kremlin is serious about con-
trolling information within its borders. At the interna-
tional level, Russia is normalizing and helping to spread
networked authoritarianism through various strategies
in internet governance fora, at the UN, and through
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization “authoritarians’
club” (see Pearce & Kendzior, 2012, for an examina-
tion of networked authoritarianism in Azerbaijan). At the
same time, it has been waging a slow, covert campaign
to dismantle the transatlantic alliance using “information
weapons” honed in its near-abroad, most famously in
Ukraine but also in Moldova. If information has always
been political, today it is geopolitical and weaponized.
If true, the allegations of Russian interference in
Western elections, including the 2016 U.S. presidential
contest, would clearly constitute a pattern of “informa-
tion aggression”. Russia may be trying to give its adver-
saries a taste of as their own medicine (as the Krem-
lin sees it), or it may be teaching the world an ob-
ject lesson on the dangers of the free flow of infor-
mation. It is also possible that having failed to garner
support for a norm against informational violations of
state sovereignty, Russia decided to use that power-
ful weapon to reshape the international system to bet-
ter fit its authoritarian, Westphalian worldview. Regard-
less of the grand strategy pursued by Putin, the tac-
tics used insidiously turned open societies’ strengths—
pluralism, free expression, acceptance of diversity—
against them at a time when they were especially vul-
nerable. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis the economic recovery has left too many be-
hind, for which many Americans blame coastal elites
and the incumbent Democrats. Populist contestations
of capitalism, including the surveillance capitalism that
powers the internet economy (Zuboff, 2015), open a
door for competing political projects like the far-right
ethno-nationalisms gaining ground across Europe and,
of course, the Trump phenomenon—itself no stranger
to xenophobia and white supremacist themes. Liberal
democracies’ policy responses must navigate between
Scylla and Charibdis, facing down the threat of far-right
extremism without developing our own version of net-
worked authoritarianism.
10. Towards a Geopolitics of Information
As early as 2012, Rebecca MacKinnon predicted that “in
the twenty-first century, many of the most acute politi-
cal and geopolitical struggles will involve access to and
control of information” (2012, p. XXV). Geopolitical de-
bates about the flow of information typically pit champi-
ons of free expression and access to information against
those who want to see state sovereignty replicated in cy-
berspace. There are shades of gray between those posi-
tions, of course, but it is nevertheless an ideological di-
vision that should be taken seriously. As Shawn Powers
andMichael Jablonski note in their book about the Inter-
net Freedom Agenda:
The real cyber war is not over offensive capabilities
or cybersecurity but rather about legitimizing exist-
ing institutions and norms governing Internet indus-
tries in order to assure their continued market domi-
nance and profitability….While heavy-handed govern-
ment controls over the Internet should be resisted,
so should a system whereby Internet connectivity re-
quires the systematic transfer of wealth from the de-
veloping world to the developed. (Powers & Jablonski,
2015, p. 24)
Powers and Jablonski thus identify two internet-
mediated threats to human wellbeing: information
controls (Crete-Nishihata, Deibert, & Senft, 2013) and
surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2015). The former repre-
sents a threat from the state, while the latter is best un-
derstood as a threat from capitalism. This article has de-
scribed a third threat: information warfare, a threat from
external adversaries who strategically use information
to achieve geopolitical goals—or, as defined by the for-
mer head of the Directorate for ElectronicWarfare of the
RussianMain Naval Staff, “securing national policy objec-
tives both in peacetime and in wartime through means
and techniques of influencing the information resources
of the opposing side” (Pomerantsev, 2016, p. 181).
However, it is important not to succumb to false
equivalencies that equate civic activities (like teaching
people how to run elections) with the presentmoment—
the stuff of dystopian science fiction. U.S. democracy
promotion and the Internet Freedom Agenda undoubt-
edly support regime change in a number of countries
by bolstering alternative political projects (author inter-
view with Daniel Sepulveda, 2015), however that is far
from being the only reason for supporting fair elections
or the open internet. In many cases, the U.S. is less inter-
ested in supporting a specific alternative to the incum-
bent regime than it is in opening markets for U.S. compa-
nies, and many individual policymakers and bureaucrats
genuinely embrace the ideals of access to information,
free expression, and accountable democracy (Powers &
Jablonski, 2015). Moreover, there is no evidence that do-
mestic demands for free and fair elections, or a free and
open internet, are anything other than genuine, includ-
ing in Russia.
The past several years have seen a shift from a nor-
mative debate between the “free flow” and “online
sovereignty” camps, to carefully plotted intervention.
President Barack Obama noted in a 2009 speech that
“the great irony of the information age” is that “those
states that havemost successfully adopted and exploited
the opportunities afforded by the Internet are also the
most vulnerable to range of threats that accompany it”
(Carr, 2016, p. 2). Indeed, the Russian campaign’s two
greatest ostensible victories to date, the British “Brexit”
vote and Donald Trump’s victory, took place in deeply
connected societies. If politics is war by other means,
thenwemight call this terrorismby othermeans. Like ter-
rorism, information warfare turns open societies against
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themselves, creating chaos andbreeding suspicion.With-
out knowing friend from foe, or credible analysis from
“fake news”, societies become paralyzed, unable to coor-
dinate against a shape-shifting enemy that many doubt
is even there. For scholar Madeline Carr, “No previous
technology has been regarded concurrently as a source
of power and vulnerability in quite the way that the In-
ternet has” (Carr, 2016, p. 2).
Monroe Price’s (2015) examination of “the new
strategic communication” provides a useful framework
for understanding the new geopolitics of information.
The concept almost seems tailor-made for the current
crisis: strategic communication is a “consolidating rela-
tionship between information and power” that is “heav-
ily subsidized, usually transnational, engineered and of-
ten deceptive” (p. 7), and it is “sensitive to the particular
environment in which the information intervention takes
place” (p. 9). This describes Russian intervention inWest-
ern elections perfectly. Price argues that the affordances
of ICTs have “raised the consequences and possibilities of
strategic communication to new levels” (p. 1), empower-
ing states to “experiment with ways to ‘move the needle’
of public opinion among targeted populations utilizing
advanced tools of communication and [to] integrate the
consequences in their theories of speech and conduct”
(p. 3). Having failed to secure an international agreement
circumscribing transnational communication, Russia re-
solved to use “information weapons” first in the pursuit
of its strategic objectives, with apparent success.
At least part of that success can be traced to the state
of our media ecosystem. Before Facebook launched in
2005, “the often unstated assumption was that [informa-
tion intermediaries like newspapers and television net-
works] would function (or would be obligated to func-
tion) as guardians of the public interest” (Price, 2015,
p. 35). The system was far from perfect, but by and
large media institutions took their gatekeeping role se-
riously, and followed a highly developed code of journal-
ism ethics.
Today’s intermediaries have no such ethical code,
and some explicitly reject a sense of responsibility for
their platforms’ impact on society, as Facebook’s Mark
Zuckerberg did at several points during the 2016 U.S.
presidential campaign (Zuckerberg, 2016). Further com-
plicating matters, the most visible intermediaries have a
global footprint: how does a profit-seeking corporation,
lacking any appetite to perform journalistic functions, de-
termine what is in the best interest of humanity?
Meanwhile, traditionalmedia outlets have lost adver-
tising revenues and audience shares to social media plat-
forms, and in their weakened financial state have been
absorbed by vertically integrated media conglomerates
motivated by financial gain (McChesney, 2013; Pickard,
2014, 2017). The quality of discourse suffers, and the
public struggles to parse truth from falsehood, opinion
from fact. The “marketplace of ideas” is flooded with
mediocre fare that anyone can access for free. Journal-
ists struggle to make a living, and would-be members of
the Fourth Estate flock to careers in public relations. The
“quality control” on the public sphere erodes inexorably,
leaving public discourse vulnerable to manipulation.
Price introduces the concept of “strategic architec-
tures”, which he defines as “large-scale efforts to fix or
stabilize the relationship of states and other major play-
ers to information flows” (p. 9):
These wholesale approaches include active rethink-
ing of communications structures by powerful states
so as to maintain control over their own narratives
and affect relevant communications systems outside
their borders. These are designs not only of govern-
ment but of the corporate empires for whom com-
munication is key and certainly for the media com-
panies themselves. For those who seek to ensure a
particular narrative—for example, of governmental
legitimacy, religious authenticity, or the advantages
of consumerism—establishing an infrastructure they
can control is significant. (Price, 2015, pp. 9–10)
As John Gilmore said in 1993, the free and open global
internet treats censorship as damage and routes around
it, presenting a threat to networked authoritarianism.
The threat would have been even greater if it had been
embraced and promoted by a hegemonic power, as
would doubtless have been the case under a Hillary Clin-
ton presidency. The Kremlin saw undermining her pres-
idency, and Americans’ faith in democracy, as a geopo-
litical imperative, and established a strategic infrastruc-
ture to spread messages that would favor her opponent,
Donald Trump, whose authoritarian predisposition, igno-
rance of global affairs, and business ties to Russia further
increased his value as a “useful fool” (Davidson, 2016;
Miller & Entous, 2017) The early days of the Trump presi-
dency show no indication that the 45th president will re-
spect, much less support, a free press or open internet.
11. Conclusion
The brewing conflict between Vladimir Putin’s regime
and the liberal democracies of Europe and North Amer-
ica appears to pit two conflicting paradigms about the
role of information—distributed via the internet—in soci-
ety (Zuboff, 2015). This article has described Russia’s his-
torical and contemporary approaches to controlling the
flow of information, both domestically and at the inter-
national level, to argue that Russia does not view inter-
net governance, cybersecurity, and media policy as sepa-
rate domains. Rather, all the areas covered by those dis-
ciplines falls under “information security” for Russian for-
eign policy. Domestic surveillance, content censorship
and illiberal internet governance reform are deeply con-
nected to misinformation campaigns abroad, and are
used strategically to achieve geopolitical goals.
Despite all its flaws, liberal democracy is still the best
form of governance available if the goal is to ensure hu-
man rights and economic prosperity. Just as networked
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authoritarianism establishes strategic infrastructures to
control themessage domestically and intervene in global
media systems, we need to rethink our media and com-
munication infrastructures to ensure they foster a plural-
ist, rights-respecting society that is resilient to authoritar-
ianism and extremism. Governments, corporations, civil
society organizations and the public all have roles to play
in this endeavor.
Moreover, the liberal democracies of Europe and
North America need significant reforms to fulfill their
promises to their citizens if they are to survive. In theU.S.,
Barack Obama’s presidency was a solid, albeit imperfect,
start that a majority of voters endorsed by voting for
Hillary Clinton. Scholars of all disciplines should consider
how their work can support the positive reforms that our
democracies urgently need, counter the forces of author-
itarianism, and actively participate in the shared work of
governance.
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